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complete extinction of all value and effectuated a physical taking.
The government's third argument insisted that both the terms of
Tulare's contract and the background principles of state law imposed
limits on Tulare's titles that rendered their water loss noncompensable. The government contended that Tulare's contracts
entitled them to only the amount of water made available to the DWR.
Because the water was not available to the DWR, Tulare had no claim
to the foregone flow. However, the court dismissed the government's
legal authority as inapposite. The court pointed out the government
lacked the contractual immunity from liability they relied on in their
arguments.
Finally, the government offered a common law justification for
limiting the scope of Tulare's property right. Specifically, Tulare
could not have a vested right in a use or method of diverting water that
was unreasonable or violated the public trust. The court rejected the
government's assertion.
The SWRCB defined a comprehensive
scheme that balanced and allocated water rights among users in the
decision D-1484 ("decision"). Once the SWRCB made an allocation
under the decision, that determination defined the scope of Tulare's
property and contract rights. Therefore, the decision protected
Tulare's right to divert water, notwithstanding the SWRCB's
compliance with the RPAs.
Thus, the court held that the federal government was free to
preserve fish; however, it must pay for the water it takes to do so.
John A. Helfrich

Klump v. United States, 50 Fed. C1. 268 (2001) (holding the United
States Bureau of Land Management asserted water rights through the
same legal channels applicable to individuals, and thus it did not
violate the Fifth Amendment takings clause).
Luther Klump ("Klump") alleged the United States violated the
Fifth Amendment by taking his property without providing just
compensation. Klump made various earlier claims, which the United
States Court of Federal Claims addressed in prior orders. Klump's loss
of water rights remained the only issue, on which the United States
moved for summary judgment.
Klump had water rights associated with cattle grazing permits on
land in southeastern Arizona owned by the United States Bureau of
Land Management ("BLM"). During the term of the permits, Klump
and the BLM disputed over Klump's alleged failure to comply with
some of the inherent conditions, such as allowing his cattle to graze in
prohibited areas. As a result, the BLM cancelled Klump's permit,
ordered him to remove his cattle from the land, and impounded some
of his cattle. These legal developments prompted the Arizona
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Department of Water Resources to transfer Klump's water rights,
associated with the now cancelled permit, to the BLM. Klump alleged
the BLM's actions constituted a taking of his property, including water
and grazing rights, livestock, and entitlement to use his ranch.
However, the court found BLM did not obtain the water rights by
exercising its sovereign power under the Fifth Amendment to take
private property.
The BLM argued it obtained the rights through normal state
procedures, not by exercising sovereign power. Klump, conversely,
maintained that the BLM did utilize such power without providing just
compensation, and, as such, violated the Fifth Amendment. When the
government "takes" property, it exercises its sovereign right to acquire
property from its rightful owner for the public good and must provide
just compensation. However, in this case, the United States did not
exercise such sovereign power. Instead, the United States claimed
rightful ownership of the property via water rights. Thus, the BLM did
not act unilaterally to affect its claim through the exercise of sovereign
powers, but, instead, applied to a state agency to have the water rights
transfer authorized. By doing so, the BLM acted as an individual
landowner, not as a sovereign. It therefore submitted itself to the
same laws governing individuals, and removed itself from the ambit of
Fifth Amendment takings claims. Thus, this case involved conflicting
claims of rightful ownership between two private parties, and not a
sovereign acquisition of property. Accordingly, the court held the
taking claim invalid.
Willow Arnold

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
California v. California Coastal Comm'n, 150 F. Supp. 2d 1046 (N.D.
Cal. 2001) (holding oil and gas lease suspensions are federal activities
requiring a determination of consistency with state coastal
management programs, and an explanation of categorical exclusions
under the National Environmental Policy Act is necessary).
This case involved oil and gas lease suspensions governed by the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act ("Act"). Under the Act, there are
four required steps to receive an oil and gas lease. The final step
requires the filing and review of a development and production plan
("DPP"). The DPP must be submitted along with a certification that
each activity was consistent with the state's coastal management
program. Between 1968 and 1984, the Mineral Management Service
("MMS"), a division of the Department of the Interior, conducted four
sales of oil and gas leases for the Outer Continental Shelf ("OCS") off
the coast of California, which resulted in it issuing forty leases. Until
1992, MMS had granted suspensions on the leases. In that year,

